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NOTES AND COMMENTS
with manufacturing whiskey, and a picture was taken of the accused
standing next to his still. In each case the accused was not told or advised
that posing for the picture was optional. The element of compulsion in
the Spencer case is the same as it was in the Alabama and Georgia cases.
It arises where the accused feels he must obey the officer because he was
not told he had a right to disobey him. For example, in the Spencer case
the accused had no choice whether he would perform the tests before the
movie camera. This is what caused the motion picture of the coordination
tests to be tainted as evidence.
This decision and others that preceded it in Oklahoma show
conclusively that Oklahoma follows the more liberal interpretation of the
prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination.,6 "The proper guide
in the interpretation of the constitutional guaranty against compulsory
self-incrimination is not the probability of the evidence; but is the capa-
bility of abuse."'1 It may be argued that convictions are hard to get if the
prohibition is construed liberally. This may be true. However, the Okla-
homa Constitution does not state merely that the accused cannot be com-
pelled to testify; but says: 'No person shall be compelled to give evi-
dence which will tend to incriminate him.' 8 As was held in the Spencer
case, the term evidence in its ordinary meaning includes more than just
testimony. Therefore, it would seem that if the framers of the constitu-
tion intended for it to mean only testimony, they would have used the
term testimony and not the term evidence.
Expediency or zeal should not be the criteria when individual con-
stitutional rights are involved. The court in the Spencer case is saying
that law enforcement agencies should be more cognizant of the rights
of the accused during their investigation. As Chief Justice Warren stated
in Spano v. New York: 19 "ITIhe police must obey the law while enforc-
ing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
actual criminals themselves."
Gerald Weis
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILY--CIGARxrrE MANUFACTURR-
LUNG CANCER.
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Company,' plaintiff
brought suit against a cigarette manufacturer alleging that cancer2 of his
16 See 28 R.C.L. Witnesses 5 20 (1921).
17 Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944).
18 OKLA. CONST. art 2, § 21.
'9 360 U.S. 315, 320, 321 (1959).
' 350 F. 2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
2 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 293 (3d Cir.
1961). The cancer involved here is medically known as bronchogenic carcinoma,
squamous cell type (footnote by the court).
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right lung was caused by smoking Chesterfields from 1921 to 1953.3
Plaintiff based his claim on theories of negligence and breach of war-
ranty. He alleged that the tobacco company was liable for negligence in
manufacturing cigarettes containing carcinogenic4 ingredients and in
failing to warn consumers of the presence of those ingredients. He also
claimed that defendant was liable for breach of both express and implied
warranties. Plaintiff proffered the following evidence: (a) testimony of
five eminent physicians on a positive causal relationship between cancer
and cigarette smoking; (b) various advertisements of defendant's product
which assured the public the cigarettes were harmless; (c) that certain
tests defendant had conducted in 1952, resulting in the widely publicized
conclusion that the cigarettes had no harmful effect on "nose, throat, and
accessory organs," were in fact inconclusive and inadequate; and (d) that
between 1921 and 1953 defendant made no further tests of its product.
On the defendant's motions, the district court dismissed the war-
ranty count and directed a verdict for defendant on the negligence count
because of insufficient evidence to support a verdict on that theory. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding
there was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury finding on the following
questions: (a) the causal relation between smoking and cancer; (b) the
alleged negligence of the defendant; and (c) the alleged breaches of war-
ranties.5
The new trial in November of 1962 resulted in a jury verdict for the
defendant based on special interrogatories submitted to the jury by the
court.( The jury found: (a) plaintiff's smoking of Chesterfields was "the
cause or one of the causes" of his lung cancer; (b) defendant was not
negligent; (c) defendant made no express warranties upon which plain-
tiff relied as an inducement to purchase the cigarettes; and (d) plaintiff
assumed the risk by smoking the cigarettes.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court in July of 1965 and
granted plaintiff a new triaL7 The majority ruled that the trial court's
charge on express warranty was defective for vagueness and for telling
the jury they could not find an express warranty unless the "seller actually
intended to be bound by his statement." The court of appeals unanimous-
ly reversed judgment for defendant because of the trial court's flawed in-
struction that assumption of risk would be a defense without clarifying for
the jury the two different meanings of that defense. In its primary sense,
3 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa.
1955).
4 "Carcinogenic" is defined as that which produces cancer. MALLOY, MmICAL
DICTONARY FOR LAWYEMs 106 (2d ed. 1951). "It has long been established
that prolonged contact with some kinds of extrinsic irritants produces a marked
affinity for certain cancer types." These irritants are called carcinogenic agents.
Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cancer: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept
of Causation, 31 TEXAs L. REV. 630, 634-5 (1953).
5 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
6 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., Civil No. 12820, W.D. Pa.,
Nov. 9, 1962.
7 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., supra note 1.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
assumption of risk involves knowing of a risk, appreciating it, and volun-
tarily choosing to encounter it. In its secondary meaning, assumption of
risk is equivalent to contributory negligence and involves failure to use
due care for one's own safety. The court held that assumption of risk in
the primary sense is a defense to a warranty action, but in the secondary
sense it is not.8 The court stated:
There was overwhelming evidence that many of the de-
fendant's advertisements carried factual affirmations, pro-
fessedly based on medical research, that Chesterfields were
safe and smoking them could have no adverse effect on "the
nose, throat and accessory organs." These advertisements
were calculated to overcome any fears the potential consum-
ers might have had as to the harmful effects of cigarettes,
and particularly Chesterfields. Under the circumstances it
is difficult to perceive how the plaintiff, a cabinetmaker
with no scientific background, could have been charged
with notice or knowledge of a danger, which the defendant,
with its professed superior knowledge, extensively adver-
tised did not exist.9
Law suits against tobacco companies arising out of injuries sustained
from using tobacco products are not new, but this case is significant be-
cause of the possibility of a recovery without showing any particular for-
eign deleterious substance. There have been many cases involving fish-
hooks, worms and other materials in chewing and smoking tobacco and
also cases involving exploding cigars.'0 Probably the most famous case is
where the plaintiff sued a tobacco manufacturer for damages sustained
as a result of discovering a human toe in a state of putrefaction imbedded
in a plug of Brown Mule chewing tobacco." The similarity between the
foreign substance cases and the cigarette-cancer cases just about ends with
naming the tobacco companies as defendants.
There have been at least six other cases involving the smoking-cancer
problem, but three of them will not be discussed because the litigation in-
volved only procedural or pleading matters and did not go to the sub-
stantive problems.' 2 The case of Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
and Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.,'3 pointed out that in Louisiana, in the
case of food products and other articles intended for human consumption,
8 Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933); Brown v. Chap-
man, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276
F. 2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.
2d 568 (1959).
0 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., supra note 1, at 486.10 Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (1936);
Corum v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933); Lig-
gett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d 612 (1932).11 Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
12 Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (1st Ci. 1958);
Padovani v. Bruckhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. American
Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
13 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
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there is a principle of strict liability regardless of fault. However, liability
is only for a defective condition not contemplated by the consumer, the
harmful consequences of which, based on the state of human knowledge,
are foreseeable. The court stated, "Thus far, public policy has not decreed
absolute liability for 'the harmful effects of which no developed skill or
foresight can avoid.' 14
In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,'5 the Florida Supreme Court de-
cided that an implied warranty of wholesomeness does not require that
the risks of harm because of deleterious matter in the product need be
known to the manufacturer. The court said the basis of liability is the
undertaking or agreement by the manufacturer to be responsible in the
event the thing sold is not in fact merchantable. The Fifth Circuit re-
manded the case for the trial court to determine whether the cigarettes
were "reasonably fit and wholesome for human consumption."'l The main
issue in Ross v. Phillip Morris Co.,i7 was whether implied warranty ap-
plied only to substances in the manufactured product, the harmful effects
of which could be foreseen by ordinary human skill and foresight. The
court said that under the facts of the case absolute liability would not
cover substances in the manufactured product which were not foreseeably
harmful.
The increased knowledge of the causal relation of smoking and
cancer may work a hardship on tobacco companies because they can no
longer benefit by the rule that implied warranty of wholesomeness is.
limited to those risks which could be foreseeable by the application of
reasonable human skill and foresight. The cases discussed show a trend
toward holding tobacco companies strictly liable under an implied war-
ranty. However, case law on the cigarette-cancer problem is definitely in
a state of flux and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act' s
may have far-reaching ramifications. In this writer's opinion, the act is
the result of shrewd political maneuvering and compromise between the
cigarette industry and Congress. The act is an apparent boon to the cigar-
ette industry. It provides a privileged sanctuary for cigarette advertising
by prohibiting restrictions on merchandising by state and local bodies.
The act requires only the labeling of cigarette packages "CAUTION: CIG-
ARBITE SMOKING MAY BE HARMFUL TO YOUR HEALTH." This
14 Id. at 39.15 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
16 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
27 828 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
18 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1506, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5§ 4, 5 (b) (Aug. 20, 1965).
'It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or package for
sale or distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which
fails to bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Haz-
ardous to Your Health." Such statement shall be located in a conspicuous place on
every cigarette package and shall appear in conspicuous and legible type in con-
trast by typography, layout, or color with other printed matter on the package.§ 5. (b). No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act."
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